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Abstract 
The aircraft engines manufacturing industry is subjected to many dependability 
constraints from certification authorities and economic background. In particular, the 
costs induced by unscheduled maintenance and delays and cancellations impose to ensure 
a minimum level of availability. For this purpose, Prognostics and Health Management 
(PHM) is used as a means to perform online periodic assessment of the engines’ health 
status. The whole PHM methodology is based on the processing of some variables 
reflecting the system’s health status named Health Indicators. The collecting of HI is an 
on-board embedded task which has to be specified before the entry into service for 
matters of retrofit costs. However, the current development methodology of PHM 
systems is considered as a marginal task in the industry and it is observed that most of the 
time, the set of HI is defined too late and only in a qualitative way. In this paper, the 
authors propose a novel development methodology for PHM systems centered on an 
anticipated model-based validation of HI. This validation is based on the use of 
uncertainties propagation to simulate the distributions of HI including the randomness of 
parameters. The paper defines also some performance metrics and criteria for the 
validation of the HI set. Eventually, the methodology is applied to the development of a 
PHM solution for an aircraft engine actuation loop. It reveals a lack of performance of the 
original set of HI and allows defining new ones in order to meet the specifications before 
the entry into service. 
Keywords: Prognostics and Health Management, Health Indicators, Validation, Model-
Based, Performance metrics. 
1. Introduction
Over the past decades, the importance of dependability within the modern aircraft engines 
manufacturing industry has grown significantly. The concept of dependability was formalized in 
the middle 1980s by Jean-Claude Laprie [1]. According the concept he developed with Avizienis, 
dependability is composed of three elements: attributes, threats and means.  
In the field of aircraft engines, attributes are commonly safety, reliability, maintenability and 
availability, threats are faults and failures and means are removal, prevention, tolerance and 
forecasting. Dependability constraints generally come from certification authorities and economic 
background: While certification authorities impose a minimum level of safety and reliability, 
economy imposes a high level of maintenability and availability. The dependability management 
of aircraft engines is currently organized as follows: 
 Removal is used to increase engines’ safety and reliability via corrective maintenance
 Prevention is used to increase engines’ safety and reliability via preventive maintenance
 Tolerance is used to increase engines’ safety via fault tolerant control and dispatch
 Forecasting is still a research subject because the computational capabilities to perform it were
not available before the advent of embedded systems and large scale networks
If we take a look at the operating costs repartition (see Fig. 1), the importance of direct 
maintenance costs traduces that the current dependability management strategy based on 
corrective and preventive maintenance entails high direct maintenance costs that are becoming 
prohibitive and could be reduced. Those costs come mainly from the following ascertainment: 
 The interval between preventive maintenance check-up is not optimized and entails many
additional costs with growing size of fleets.
 Tolerance logics result on a multiplication of faults occurrence which are often false alarms
resulting on No Fault Found (NFF).
 Aircraft engines are becoming more and more electric and as a result the number of potential
causes of failure increases. The current troubleshooting process is becoming obsolete because
not too much based on reliability analysis and not enough on physical considerations.
 In cases of no-dispatch alarms or unpredicted failure, the costs can be very high in cases where
the aircraft is blocked in an isolated airport with rudimentary maintenance center.
 Corrective maintenance results on Delays and Cancellations (D&C) which entails high
indirect costs because of indemnification to passengers.
 Eventually, the stock of spare parts, the size of fleets and the maintenance infrastructures must
be over dimensioned because of previous consideration.
In order to limit those costs, one is to increase maintenability and availability by use of 
forecasting, i.e. the ability to anticipate faults and failures and to avoid their unexpected 
appearance. Fault forecasting made a remarkable entry in the scientific world at the end of the 
Fig. 1: Repartition of operating costs for airline companies 
1990s. At first, it was dedicated to structures through Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) [2] but 
has spread to other fields with an additional management aspect to make a link between 
monitoring and maintenance. Prognostics and Health Management (PHM) [3] is the application 
of health monitoring to systems with a supervision aspect enabling new kind of maintenance 
strategies such as condition-based maintenance [4] or predictive maintenance. PHM is the most 
used term but other can be found such as Health and Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS) or 
Systems Health Management (SHM). 
The upper purpose of PHM is to improve systems availability and maintenability in order to be 
complementary to removal, prevention and tolerance in dependability management. For this aim, 
it performs diagnostics and prognostics from a set of variables reflecting the health status of the 
host system named Health Indicators (HI). The set of health indicators should be capable of: 
 Detecting degradation modes occurring in the host system
 Identify threat precursors
 Localize the degrading functional unit
 Prognose the Remaining Useful Life (RUL) before threat occurrence
These HI are the keystone of PHM: a bad selection will ensure bad performances for the PHM 
system. Moreover, because of prohibitive controller retrofit costs in aircraft engines industry, the 
embedded part of PHM including the computation of HI should be validated before the entry into 
service. Eventually, the selection and validation of HI is a paramount step which needs to be 
undertaken in the earliest development stages. However, despite its importance, the issue of 
selecting and validating HI is rarely addressed in the scientific community. Actually, as far as the 
selection is concerned, there are research papers addressing structural residuals or parity spaces 
[5], but although the introduced methods perform well on simple simulated systems, they are not 
applicable to real operating complex systems such as aircraft engines with specific constraints 
such as imposed location and type of sensors, highly impacting environment, limited embedded 
computational and storage capacities, high development costs and certifications. Concerning the 
validation of HI, there is currently no method to validate them independently so they are validated 
during the latest development stages, simultaneously with the whole PHM system. It means that 
in the current framework, one has to wait for the host system to have experiment every type of 
faults and failures several to be able to validate the PHM system and by the same the set of HI. 
Obviously, given the level of aircraft engines reliability, it can take decades, which is not 
acceptable. 
In the light of the previous observation, the aircraft engines industry could find great interest in a 
methodology aimed at selecting and validating HI during design phases. This paper proposes such 
a methodology, based on physics based modeling of the host system and uncertainties 
propagation to create stochastic data. The selection is based on expert knowledge, experience 
feedback, equipment specifications and acceptance test procedures descriptions. The validation is 
based on the computation of four types of Numerical Key Performance Indicators (NKPI) 
assessing the potential of the HI set for respectively the detection of degradation modes, the 
identification of incoming threats’ precursors, the localization of degrading functional unit and 
the prognostics of the Remaining Useful Lifetime (RUL) of the system before the occurrence of 
next threat.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the first section presents the PHM systems 
development methodology as it is proposed by authors. The second section is dedicated to the 
selection and validation of HI. The third section addresses the issue of modeling and uncertainties 
propagation and the fourth and final section presents the application of the methodology to the 
PHM of an aircraft engine control loop with a review of the results.  
2. Prognostics and Health Management Systems
2.1. The lexical framework of PHM 
In the present PHM framework, we consider two kinds of threats: operating threats that are 
observable because related to external and ascertainable change of the system and physical threats 
that are not observable because related to internal and hidden change within the system. 
 Operating threats:
o Failures: Online observation of a loss of system’s operability.
In high safety requirement fields such as aeronautics, failures can be catastrophic if they appear in 
flight. Thus, a great part of them are “protected” by the definition of faults that play the role of 
warnings for imminent failures. However, as it is neither possible to predict every potential 
failure nor to set up a fault detection logic for those we know, failures without faults can occur. 
o Faults: Online observation of a difference between the real characteristic of an entity and the
specified characteristic, this difference exceeding the limits of acceptability.
Fault are associated with tolerance logics aimed at allowing the aircraft to finish its mission. 
Then, the removal of the fault depends on its level of dispatch. There are three types of dispatch: 
 Long-term dispatch faults: Repair or replacement is expected within hundreds of flights 
 Short-term dispatch faults: Repair or replacement is expected within dozens of flights  
 No dispatch faults (or No-go): Repair or replacement is expected immediately on site. 
 Physical threat:
o Degradation Modes: Modifications of one value of the host system’s parameters.
Degradation modes are defined by expertise, experience feedback or physical reasoning. 
 Marginal degradation modes: lead neither to fault nor failures 
 Hazardous degradation modes: Low hazard degradation modes lead to long-term or short-
term dispatch faults and High hazard degradation modes lead to No dispatch faults or 
failures 
Although only hazardous degradation modes have to be monitored for dependability purposes, it 
is necessary to consider also marginal degradation modes for identification matters because even 
if they are not dangerous for the system, they can be detected and lead to erroneous diagnostics. 
The true added value of PHM for dependability management is the consideration of degradation 
modes which enables forecasting. A given degradation mode leads to one type of operating threat 
but this is not reciprocal: an operating threat can be the result of different degradation modes.  
o Intensity: The intensity of a degradation mode is the ratio of the current value of the
degrading parameter over its mean limit value. It is given in percentage.
o Mean Limit Value: For a hazardous degradation mode, it is the value of the degrading
parameter for which the associated operating threat is reached with a probability of 0.5. For a
marginal degradation mode, it is the maximal reasonable value that the parameter can take.
For degradation mode 𝑗, the MLV is written 𝑀𝐿𝑉𝑗. The mean limit value can be determined by
expertise, experience feedback or simulation. 
In order to get information about present physical threats and imminent operating threats, we 
need vectors to collect relevant data from the system. 
 Collecting vectors:
o Health Indicators: Variable issued from a combination of measures, control values, models or
other sources of knowledge that reflects the health status of a system.
o Syndrom: Vector of the set of Health Indicators’ values at the time of observation.
o Precursor: Reference syndrom traducing the presence of a degradation mode. A precursor is
associated with the level of intensity of the running degradation mode. Typically, we consider
25%, 50%, 75% and 100% precursors.
Note that the 100% precursor traduces a state where an operating threat has 0.5 probability to 
occur. 
Finally, we need processing means to traduce the syndroms into meaningful and interpretable 
information destined to maintenance operators. 
 Processing means:
o Diagnostics: Set of operations performed to detect and identify most probable degradation
modes and localize degraded system.
o Detection: Send an alert to the support system when one HI at least crosses a threshold.
o Identification: Classify the observed syndrom with respect to a precursors’ database to
identify the type of running degradation mode.
o Localization: Determine the degraded sub-system, functional unit, equipment or component
from the identified running degradation mode.
o Prognostics: Set of operations performed to predict the remaining time before next operating
event of a system based on current diagnostics and history data.
2.2. PHM architecture 
In the case of aircraft engines, the PHM system is divided into three stations: the collecting, the 
processing and the scheduling station. The first one is embedded into the host system and in 
charge of the online computation and storage of HI. The sending of HI is commonly performed at 
Fig. 2: Global architecture of a PHM system 
the end of each flight. The second station is in the Health Monitoring (HM) system and in charge 
of the offline computation of status indicators. Status indicators are structures broadcasting 
information about the system health status from the HM system to the support system. The third 
station is part of the support system and in charge of updating the maintenance plan with respect 
to the status indicators received from the processing station. The interaction between these 
stations is shown in Fig. 2. Each station has its own development issues: 
 Collecting station: Selection and validation of a performing set of HI.
 Processing station: Implementation and verification of algorithmic solutions for diagnostics
and prognostics.
 Scheduling station: Network implementation and database management. Interfaces between
processing results and maintenance operators.
Concerning the functioning of PHM, we will consider the following scheme: the Open System 
Architecture for Condition-Based Maintenance (OSA-CBM). The correspondence between the 
three stations introduced above and the OSA-CBM steps is given in Fig. 3. In the remainder of 
this paper, only issues related to the collecting station are addressed. Actually, the scientific 
production is quite prolific concerning the two other stations, as evidenced by the numerous 
review papers on diagnostics and prognostics (see [6], [7]). However, all the related applications 
are, of what we know, run on systems for which the selection of HI is a simple task because 
industrial constraints are not taken into account. This paper tries to reduce the gap between 
academic research and industrial expectancies by providing a method for a model-based selection 
and validation of health indicators in the design stages. It could become a great asset for 
companies that are currently developing PHM systems with no quantifiable information about the 
quality of their HI. 
3. Development process of the collecting station
As mentioned above, the role of the collecting station is to compute and store HI online. It means 
that all the collecting algorithms have to be embedded into the controller. In aircraft engines, 
collecting algorithms are implemented into a dedicated controller named Engine Monitoring Unit 
(EMU). Because in flight environmental constraints are stringent, the EMU have neither high 
computational capabilities nor large storage capacities. Moreover, because collecting algorithms 
have the lowest level of criticality, they do not have the priority for post entry into service 
Fig. 3: OSA-CBM and stations of the PHM system 
controller updates named retrofit. Finally, the HI set have to be selected and validated at the latest 
for the end of design stages. This section introduces a methodology to achieve this purpose. 
3.1. Health Indicators Selection 
The selection consists in establishing a list of HI that seems to be a priori suitable with respect to 
the list of degradation modes. For this selection, the following items are needed (see Fig. 4): 
o The functional and organic architecture of the host system
o Results of risk analysis methods
o Equipments specifications documents
o Acceptance Test Procedures (ATP) descriptions
 Functional and organic architecture 3.1.1.
The functional architecture defines the different functions the host system is expected to be able 
to perform in a hierarchical form. The principal functions of the host system are declined into 
secondary functions for subsystems and components. The organic architecture shows the different 
subsystems, functional units and equipments of the system. In the aircraft engines industry, 
maintenance constraints have forced the arrival of modular architecture. Modular units are set of 
equipments that are replaceable online. They are named Line Replaceable Unit (LRU). In a PHM 
purpose, the most important for diagnostics is to be able to localize the degraded LRU because 
maintenance operators need this information to proceed to its replacement. The knowledge of 
functional and organic architectures allows determining the list of these LRU. 
 Risk analysis 3.1.2.
Risk analysis or risk assessment methods aim at determining quantitative or qualitative value of 
risk. Risk analysis can be based on inductive or deductive reasoning. The most famous method is 
an inductive reasoning method named Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). The purpose 
of FMEA is to perform a functional analysis of the system and to identify potential failure modes, 
their causes and their effects. FMEA can be based on every source of knowledge. In aircraft 
engines development process, FMEA is undertaken during design stages thanks to expertise and 
experience feedback. Finally, risk analysis methods allow identifying failures and their associated 
hazardous degradation modes. 
 Equipment specifications 3.1.3.
Equipments specifications are defined from the functional and organic architecture. They provide 
lists of requirements which can be of structural type (e.g. lengths, diameters, stiffness…) or of 
functional type (e.g. min flow, response time, max gap between two values…). The list of 
requirements contains generally a list of faults with associated detection and tolerance logics 
which purpose is to protect the system from reaching a failure. Faults are defined by engineers 
from the results of the risk analysis. In a PHM purpose, we want to prevent those faults from 
occurring because they often entail expensive delays and cancellations, a fortiori when they are of 
no dispatch type. Equipment specifications documents allow identifying faults and their 
associated hazardous degradation modes. 
 Acceptance test procedures 3.1.4.
In aircraft engines industry, Acceptance Test Procedures (ATP) are series of test run on 
equipments or subsystems received from suppliers to check if they comply to specification in 
order to be able to enter into service. The same tests are also used during maintenance check-ups. 
Thus, ATP are a good source of ideas for the definition of HI. Beyond the precious information 
they give, the interest to use ATP is that they are already used and mastered by maintenance 
operators so that HI based on ATP will have a better welcome due to a better understanding. 
3.2. Health Indicators Validation 
The validation consists in verifying if the established list of HI is capable of detecting and 
identifying precursors, localizing degraded LRU and predicting threat occurrence in compliance 
with performance metrics. For this validation, the following items are needed: 
o List of Line Replaceable Units (LRU)
o List of degradation modes and their correspondence with LRU
o Physics-based models of the host system and its subsystems
o Performance metrics for the validation
o Specifications of required values of the performance metrics
 List of line replaceable units 3.2.1.
Because the final objective of PHM is maintenance, the localization of degraded LRU is the most 
important feature of the diagnostics. Therefore, the list of LRU is of paramount importance. It is 
obtained from the organic architecture knowledge (see Fig. 4). 
 List of degradation modes 3.2.2.
One of the PHM objectives being to detect and identify hazardous degradation modes, it is 
necessary to have the list of these degradation modes. The list of hazardous ones come from risk 
analysis and equipment specifications as explained above. However, it is not sufficient as we need 
to consider also the marginal degradation modes in order to validate the identification. The list of 
marginal degradation modes can be established thanks to an analysis of the model’s parameters 
combined with scientific publications and expert advices. 
 Physics-based models 3.2.3.
The physics-based model of the system can be built as soon as the organic architecture of the host 
system is adopted. Then, the values of the parameters are determined via equipment 
specifications. 
 Performance metrics 3.2.4.
In order to assess the quality of the HI, some performance metrics are needed. The principal 
performance metrics are detectability, identificability, localizability and prognosticability defined 
from Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves and introduced in the next section.   
 HI performance requirements 3.2.5.
In order to validate the selection of HI, the performance metrics have to be calculated and 
compared to some performance requirements: 𝑇𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶 and 𝐹𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶 , respectively the specified
minimal true positive and maximal false positive ratio, 𝐷𝐻%, 𝐼𝐻%, 𝐿𝑈% and 𝑃𝐻%, the 
percentage of respectively detectable hazardous degradation modes, identifiable hazardous 
degradation modes, localizable LRU and prognosticable hazardous degradation modes.  
4. Performance Metrics
In order to quantify the potential of the set of HI to meet the specifications, the authors have 
defined some performance metrics called Numerical Key Performance Indicators (NKPI). The 
main particularity of these NKPI is that they can be computed as soon the design phases because 
their calculation only needs distributions of HI characterizing healthy and degraded states. These 
distributions can be computed via uncertainties propagation on a model. The NKPI are defined 
from Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curves [8], a well-known graphical tool in signal 
detection theory [9] which illustrates the performance of a binary classifier. ROC curves are 
created by plotting the rate of False Positive (FP) versus the rate of True Positive (TP) for 
varying discrimination thresholds. In practice, ROC curves are drawn from two distributions of a 
given HI 𝑖; the first one representing the nominal state noted 𝑇𝑖
0, and the second one representing
a degraded state resulting of degradation mode 𝑗 named 𝑇𝑖,𝑗
𝑚 with 𝑚 the degrading parameter’s
value. In the remainder of this paper, ℎ is the number of HI and 𝑑 the number of degradation 
modes, so that (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ ⟦1; h⟧ × ⟦1; d⟧. 
4.1. Detectability matrix 
For each couple (HI/degradation mode), the detectability index indicates if the HI is capable of 
detecting the degradation mode at its mean limit value within false positive and true positive 
specifications. In practice, we draw the ROC curve between the nominal distribution of the HI 
and the 100% precursor distribution of the HI and compute the Detectability index as following: 
𝐷(𝑇, 𝑇′) = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑂𝐶(𝑇, 𝑇′) 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑂𝐶(𝑇, 𝑇′) 𝑖𝑠 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡
(1) 
Fig. 4: Selection and Validation of health indicators 
Where the compliance point is defined as the point of coordinates (𝐹𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶 , 𝑇𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶) (see Fig. 5).
Detectability indices are computed for each couple (𝑇𝑖
0, 𝑇𝑖,𝑗
𝑀𝐿𝑉𝑗) , (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ ⟦1; h⟧ × ⟦1; d⟧ with the
value of the degrading parameter equal to 𝑀𝐿𝑉𝑗 to construct the detectability matrix 𝑫.
𝑫 = |
𝐷(𝑇1
0, 𝑇1,1
𝑀𝐿𝑉1) … 𝐷(𝑇ℎ
0, 𝑇ℎ,1
𝑀𝐿𝑉1)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐷 (𝑇1
0, 𝑇1,𝑑
𝑀𝐿𝑉𝑑) … 𝐷 (𝑇ℎ
0, 𝑇ℎ,𝑑
𝑀𝐿𝑉𝑑)
| ∈  {0,1}𝑑×ℎ (2) 
We can now define the notion of detectability for degradation modes: a degradation mode is said 
“detectable” when its corresponding column of 𝑫 is non-null. 
4.2. Identificability Matrix 
Before introducing the identificability matrix, we need to define signatures.  The signature matrix 
𝑺𝒊𝒈 is defined as follows: 
𝑺𝒊𝒈 =  |
|
𝑠 (𝑚 (𝑻𝟏,𝟏
𝑴𝑳𝑽𝟏) − 𝑚(𝑻𝟏
𝟎)) 𝐷(𝑇1
0, 𝑇1,1
𝑀𝐿𝑉1) ⋯ 𝑠 (𝑚 (𝑻𝒉,𝟏
𝑴𝑳𝑽𝟏) − 𝑚(𝑻𝒉
𝟎)) 𝐷(𝑇ℎ
0, 𝑇ℎ,1
𝑀𝐿𝑉1)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑠 (𝑚 (𝑻𝟏,𝒅
𝑴𝑳𝑽𝒅) − 𝑚(𝑻𝟏
𝟎)) 𝐷 (𝑇1
0, 𝑇1,𝑑
𝑀𝐿𝑉𝑑) ⋯ 𝑠 (𝑚 (𝑻𝒉,𝒅
𝑴𝑳𝑽𝒅) − 𝑚(𝑻𝒉
𝟎)) 𝐷 (𝑇ℎ
0, 𝑇ℎ,𝑑
𝑀𝐿𝑉𝑑)
|
| (3) 
Where 𝑚(. ) is the function computing the median of a distribution and 𝑠(. ) is the sign function. 
For degradation mode 𝑗, the signature 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝑗 is the vectors corresponding to the jth row of 𝑺𝒊𝒈.
Supposing that the set of signatures forms a Euclidian space 𝒯, the identificability index is 
defined for a couple of degradation modes (𝑗, 𝑘) as the ratio of the angular deviation between 
signatures over the optimal angular deviation.  
𝐼(𝑗, 𝑘) =
𝟏
𝝅
𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑠 (
𝑺𝒊𝒈𝑗
𝑻
∙𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒌
‖𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒋‖
𝓣
‖𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒌‖
𝓣
) (4) 
Identificability indices are then computed for each couples of degradation modes (𝑗, 𝑘) ∈ ⟦1; d⟧2
to construct the symmetric identificability matrix 𝑰. 
Fig. 5: Compliance Point and ROC curve for non-compliant HI (left) and 
compliant HI (right) 
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𝑰 = |
𝐼(1, 1) … 𝐼(1, 𝑑)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐼(𝑑, 1) … 𝐼(𝑑, 𝑑)
| ∈  [0; 1]𝑑×𝑑 (5) 
We can now define the notion of identificability for degradation modes: a degradation modes is 
said “identifiable” when its corresponding column of 𝑰 has no coefficient equal to 0 except the 
one of the diagonal. 
4.3. Localizability Matrix 
Before introducing the localizability matrix, we need to define the notion of LRU matrix. The 
LRU matrix associates each degradation mode to the LRU to which it belongs. It allows 
localizing the degraded LRU from the identified degradation mode. The LRU matrix is defined as 
follows: 
𝑼 = |
𝑢(1, 1) … 𝑢(1, 𝑙)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑢(𝑑, 1) … 𝑢(𝑑, 𝑙)
| ∈  {0; 1}𝑑×𝑙 (6) 
Where 𝑙 is the number of LRU composing the system and 𝑢(𝑗, 𝑟) is equal either to 1 if 
degradation mode 𝑗 is affecting LRU 𝑟 or equal to 0 if not. 
The localizability matrix 𝑳 is then defined as follows: 
𝑳 = 𝑼𝑻𝑰𝑼 ∈  [0; 1]𝑙×𝑙 (7) 
We can now define the notion of localizability for LRU: a LRU is said “localizable” when its 
corresponding column of 𝑳 has no coefficient equal to 0 except the one of the diagonal. 
4.4. Prognosticability Vector 
Before introducing the prognosticability matrix, we need to define the notions of Minimal 
Detectable Value (MDV). For a given degradation mode, the MDV is the minimal value of the 
degrading parameter for which at least one of the HI has a detectability equal to 1. For 
degradation mode 𝑗, the MDV is written 𝑀𝐷𝑉𝑗. The prognosticability vector 𝑷 is defined for
each degradation mode j ∈ ⟦1; d⟧ as follows:  
𝑷 = |∆(1) … ∆(𝑑)|𝑻 ∈  [0; 1]𝑑 (8) 
Where and ∆(𝑗) is the relative detection margin equal to: 
∆(𝑗) =
𝑀𝐿𝑉𝑗−𝑀𝐷𝑉𝑗
 𝑀𝐿𝑉𝑗
(9) 
We can now define the notion of prognosticability for degradation modes: a degradation mode is 
said “prognosticable” when its corresponding line of 𝑷 is non-null. In other terms, a degradation 
mode is “prognosticable” if it exists a 𝑛% precursor that is detectable, with 𝑛 <  100%. Because 
it needs a MLV, prognosticability is computable only for hazardous degradation modes. 
4.5. Final Validation 
In the end, the set of HI is validated with respect to the following criteria: 
𝐷𝐻%, 𝐼𝐻% and 𝑃𝐻% the percentages of respectively detectable, identificable and prognosticable 
hazardous degradation modes and 𝐿𝑈% the percentage of localizable LRU. 
5. Modeling and Uncertainties Propagation
5.1. System’s modeling 
Let’s suppose that the physics-based model is represented by a deterministic function 𝒻: 
𝒀 = 𝒻(𝑼, 𝜌1, … , 𝜌𝑝 ) (10) 
Where 𝑼 is the matrix of model inputs, 𝒀 is the matrix of model outputs and 𝜌1, … , 𝜌𝑝 are the
model parameters.  
 Parameters types 5.1.1.
Parameters are variables that are considered constant during a single simulation but can vary 
between two different runs. When a variable is not constant during a run, it is classified as an 
input.  
We propose the following classification for parameters  𝜌1, … , 𝜌𝑝 (see Fig. 6):
o Context parameters 𝜆1, … , 𝜆𝑐 , 𝑐 ≤ 𝑝  environmental randomness affecting the host system
o Structural parameters 𝛽1, … , 𝛽𝑠, 𝑠 ≤ 𝑝  structural randomness of the host system. There are
two types of structural parameters:
 Epistemic parameters 𝛾1, … , 𝛾𝑒  structural parameters that cannot evolve into degradation
 Degradation parameters 𝛿1, … , 𝛿𝑑  structural parameters that can evolve into degradation
 Inputs and Outputs 5.1.2.
For an aircraft engine, a great part of both control and environmental variables are stationary 
during the cruise which is the longest part of the mission. In parallel, health indicators are 
generally defined as variables reflecting an average behavior of the system over a complete 
mission. Because of these observations, we chose to use real signals retrieved and adapted from 
other older engines as inputs to the model. In the present paper, we do not consider the impact of 
inputs on HI so we use the same set of inputs for every simulation, which lead to a model with 
constant inputs 𝒻𝑼. Concerning the outputs of the system, we directly compute the set Health
Indicators 𝜑
1
, … , 𝜑
ℎ
. Finally, we have the following model:
  
Parameters 
Context 
Structural 
Epistemic Degradation 
𝝀𝟏 
𝝀𝟑 
𝝀𝟐 
𝜸𝟏 𝜸𝟐 𝜹𝟏 
𝜹𝟑 
𝜹𝟐 
Fig. 6: Classification of the different types of parameters for a system modeling 
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𝛾𝑒
| , |
𝛿1
⋮
𝛿𝑑
|) ⟺ 𝛗 = 𝒻𝑼(𝝀, 𝜸, 𝜹) (11) 
5.2. Uncertainties Propagation 
 Uncertainties Management 5.2.1.
When it comes to the modeling of multi-physic complex systems subject to real operating 
conditions, to manage the parameters uncertainties is of paramount importance. In this paper, two 
types of uncertainties are considered: random uncertainties derived from environment variations 
affecting context parameters and systematic uncertainties derived from manufacturing variations 
affecting epistemic parameters. Taking into account uncertainties consists in replacing the 
deterministic vectors 𝝀 and 𝜸 by random vectors 𝚲 and 𝚪. The random variables composing the 
random vectors can be characterized by their Probability Density Functions (PDF). Uncertainties 
management is performed in two steps: First, uncertainties localization consists in establishing 
the list of parameters subject to uncertainties. Then, uncertainties quantification consists in 
defining the pdf for every parameter. The pdf are usually defined by the type of their distribution 
(normal, uniform, generalized extreme values...) and their parameter vector 𝜽 = (𝜃1, … , 𝜃𝑟)
𝑇
with 𝑟 the number of parameters for the considered type of distribution. For example, 
 Λ3~𝒢ℰ𝒱(𝜇, 𝜎, 𝜉) means that the uncertainty on Λ3 is defined by a generalized extreme value
distribution of location 𝜇, scale 𝜎 and shape 𝜉. The uncertainties quantification can be very 
expensive and time-demanding when the number of parameters is large. The way the 
quantification of uncertainties is performed depends on the type of parameter: 
 Context parameters: because the context is very similar between different types of engines,
we generally use data from other systems to determine their empirical PDF.
 Epistemic parameters: they are mostly dimensional parameters whose values and
uncertainties interval can be found in equipments specifications. The difficulty is to traduce
specifications into PDF. Most of the time, the specified uncertainties interval is modeled by a
uniform PDF.
 Degradation parameters: The case of degradation parameters is different. They are fixed
during a given Monte-Carlo simulation set but they vary between two sets. Thus, we do not
need a PDF because we do not perform random selection on their value. Actually, they are
defined by their nominal and maximal values (MLV).
 Monte-Carlo Simulations 5.2.2.
Thanks to uncertainties quantification, it is possible to compute the distributions of HI from a 
deterministic model by randomly sampling the uncertain parameters values according to their pdf. 
This operation is called uncertainties propagation [10]. Many tools are available for uncertainties 
propagation but the most famous and proven one is the Monte-Carlo Simulation (MCS) [11]. 
This method will be used in this paper with 𝑞 the number of iterations. In this stochastic 
framework, Equ.6 can be written: 
𝜱 = 𝒻𝑼(𝚲, 𝚪, 𝜹) (12) 
Where 𝜱 = (𝛷1, … , 𝛷ℎ) 
𝑻 the random vector of HI is, 𝑼 is the input matrix,  𝜞 = (𝛤1, … , 𝛤𝑒)
𝑻 is
the random vector of epistemic parameters, 𝜦 = (𝛬1, … , 𝛬𝑏)
𝑻 is the random vector of context
parameters and 𝜹 is the deterministic vector of the current degradation state. 
Finally, a Monte-Carlo simulation set is run for different configurations of 𝜹 in order to compute 
all the distributions necessary for the validation of HI. For example, if a degradation mode is 
modeled by the increase of parameter 𝛿𝑎 , we need to compute the random vector 𝜱 for growing
values of 𝛿𝑎  up to the mean limit value.
6. Application on an Aircraft Engine Actuation Loop
6.1. System’s Presentation 
 System’s Functions 6.1.1.
The purpose of the VSV system is to control the amount of airflow through the High Pressure 
Compressor to provide optimum performance. The VSV actuation system varies the angle-of-
attack of the variable stator vanes to maintain a smooth and turbulent free airflow through the 
compressor at all engine operating conditions. This control of airflow is aimed at preventing the 
engine from stalling. The actuators work in pairs as part of a closed loop electro-hydraulic 
system, to constantly adjust the position of the stator vanes. The VSV Actuators are controlled by 
the Digital Engine Control Unit (DECU) via a servovalve. Note that the method introduced in 
this paper has also been applied on the high pressure pump of aircraft engines’ fuel system [12]. 
 System’s Architecture 6.1.2.
The system is composed of four equipments: the DECU, or controller, the servovalve and two 
cylinders with encompassed LVDT sensors. The regulated variable is the real selected position of 
the cylinder 𝑋𝑆 equal to the mean of 𝑋1 and 𝑋2 respectively real positions of cylinders 1 and 2.
The VSV loop scheme is given in Fig. 7, where 𝑋𝑑𝑚𝑑 is the position demand, 𝑋𝑚1 and  𝑋𝑚2 the
measured position from respectively LVDT1 and LVDT2,  𝑋𝑚𝑆 the selected measured position,
𝜀 the error, 𝐼𝑐 the control current, and 𝑄𝑆𝑉 the outlet flow from the servovalve.
 System’s Equipments 6.1.3.
 DECU: The DECU performs two main functions. The first one is to regulate the position of
the actuators via a feedback mechanism of type Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) with
variable gains. The second one is to calculate the most probable value of the measured
position 𝑋𝑚𝑆 from 𝑋𝑚1 and 𝑋𝑚2. In this paper, we suppose that this selected value is the mean
of the two measured values. The sampling period or Real Time Clock (RTC) of the DECU is
Fig. 7: Architecture of the Variable Stator Vane loop 
equal to 0.015s. 
 Actuators: The translation of the VSV actuator rod induces the movement of the VSV
kinematic that is attached to the individual stator vanes. The two cylinders’ rods are linked by
a flexible connection with known stiffness 𝐾. The VSV Actuators are fuel driven actuators. In
order to prevent the fuel from coking because of overheating, a cooling diaphragm links the
two chambers (see Fig. 8).
 LVDTs: Each of the two actuators contains a single dual coil Linear Variable Differential
Transformer (LVDT) sensor which allows the close loop control (see Fig. 8).
 Servovalve: The servovalve is of type flapper-nozzle. Fig. 8 shows the architecture of this
type of servovalve. The pressure difference ∆𝑃 between supply and return ports depends on
the rotation speed of the engine 𝑁2. The servovalve feeds the two cylinders. The null current
is the current for which the servovalve is in an equilibrium state, i.e. when the flapper is
centered.
6.2.  System Analysis 
 Failures, Faults and Degradation Modes 6.2.1.
 Failures: From the risk analysis method results, we were able to determine the potential
failure of the system. The subsystem VSV is subjected to one failure which is the loss of
controllability of the loop. In order to prevent the system from reaching this failure, some
faults were defined by engineers:
 Faults:
o Position fault: when the absolute value of the error 𝜀 is higher than 2.9mm during 10 RTC.
o Position gap fault: when the position gap between 𝑋𝑚1 and 𝑋𝑚2 is greater than 3.5mm.
Both are no dispatch faults so their associated degradation modes are high hazard degradation 
modes: 
 Degradation modes: the list of degradation modes was determined thanks to a combination of
expert knowledge and good studies on servovalve degradation modes which can be found in
[13] and [14]. Some degradation modes were also added to the list after a physical analysis of
the model. The list of both hazardous and marginal degradation modes is given in Table 1
were “(H)” means hazardous and “(M)” means marginal degradation modes.
Fig. 8: Scheme of the cylinder (left) and the servovalve of the VSV loop 
Table 1: List of the VSV loop’s degradation modes 
Equipment Degradation Mode Equipment Degradation Mode 
Cylinder 1 
Cylinder 1 
Cylinder 1 
Cylinder 1 
Cylinder 2 
Cylinder 2 
Cylinder 2 
Cylinder 2 
Servovalve 
Servovalve 
1.Increase of static friction (H)
2.Increase of viscous friction (M)
3.Clogging of cooling orifice (H)
4.Wear of interchambers sealing (M)
5.Increase of static friction (H)
6.Increase of viscous friction (M)
7.Clogging of cooling orifice (H)
8.Wear of interchambers sealing (M)
9.Null current negative drift (H)
10.Increase of feedback stiffness (M)
Servovalve 
Servovalve 
Servovalve 
Servovalve 
Servovalve 
Servovalve 
LVDT1 
LVDT1 
LVDT2 
LVDT2 
11.Clogging of left filter (H)
12.Clogging of right filter (H)
13.Abrasion of the right corner (M)
14.Abrasion of the left corner (M)
15.Increase of viscous friction (M)
16. Wear of interchambers sealing (M)
17.Positive drift (H)
18.Negative drift (H)
19.Positive drift (H)
20.Negative drift (H)
 Uncertainties Management 6.2.2.
Thanks to both analysis of data from other engines and expert knowledge, the list of context and 
epistemic random parameters was established. The following Table 2 gives, for each parameter, 
its type (C for context and E for epistemic), its abbreviation and its uncertainty quantification 
under the form of a PDF where 𝒩(𝜇, 𝜎) defines a normal distribution of mean 𝜇 and standard 
deviation 𝜎 and 𝒰(𝑎, 𝑏) defines a uniform distribution between 𝑎 and 𝑏. The real values cannot 
be given here because matters of confidentiality.  
Table 2: List of the VSV loop’s context and epistemic parameters and their uncertainties 
Parameter Uncertainties Parameter Uncertainties 
C: Fuel temperature 𝑇𝑓  𝒩(𝜇, 𝜎) E: Diameter rod cyl2 𝐷𝑟2 𝒰(𝑎, 𝑏) 
E: Diameter piston cyl1 𝐷𝑝1 𝒰(𝑎, 𝑏) E: Mass cyl2 𝑀2 𝒰(𝑎, 𝑏) 
E: Diameter rod cyl1 𝐷𝑟1 𝒰(𝑎, 𝑏) E: Chamber length cyl2 𝐶ℎ𝑙2 𝒰(𝑎, 𝑏) 
E: Mass cyl1 𝑀1 𝒰(𝑎, 𝑏) E: Diameter piston servo 𝐷𝑝𝑠 𝒰(𝑎, 𝑏) 
E: Chamber length cyl1 𝐶ℎ𝑙1 𝒰(𝑎, 𝑏) E: Diameter rod servo 𝐷𝑟𝑠 𝒰(𝑎, 𝑏) 
E: Diameter piston cyl2 𝐷𝑝2 𝒰(𝑎, 𝑏) E: Mass spool servo 𝑀𝑠 𝒰(𝑎, 𝑏) 
 Health Indicators 6.2.3.
In order to define relevant HI for monitoring the VSV loop, the acceptance test procedures were a 
good source of inspiration. For the servovalve, ATP are based on the analysis of the flow gain 
curve, giving the servovalve outlet flow versus the control current. This flow gain curve being a 
good indicator of the servovalve behavior’s conformity, the first idea is to monitor this flow gain. 
This operation can effectively be done during maintenance check-ups but it requires important 
offline instrumentation to isolate the servovalve and measure the flow. However, when the VSV 
loop is online, not only the servovalve is part of a subsystem but also it is not equipped with a 
flowmeter so we need to find indirect monitoring means. The proposed solution, which was the 
subject of a patent [15], is to use the selected cylinder’s velocity as an image of the servovalve 
outlet flow to compute the velocity gain curve. Because of the hysteresis, the raw curve has a 
large dispersion so we use a smoothing algorithm in order to obtain an exploitable curve, as 
shown in Fig. 9. Then, we define 10 HI from characteristics extracted from this curve, listed in 
Table 3.  
Table 3: List of Health Indicators from the velocity gain curve 
HI Definition HI Definition 
𝐶𝐸𝑞𝑢 
𝑌𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 
𝑌𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝 
𝑆𝑙𝑝𝐿𝑒𝑓𝑡 
𝑆𝑙𝑝𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 
Equilibrium point abscissa  
Null point abscissa 
Length of the low gain part projected 
on the ordinate axis 
Slope of the left high gain regression 
Slope of the right high gain 
regression 
𝑋𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 
𝑋𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝 
𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒 
𝑆𝑙𝑝𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 
𝐻𝑦𝑠𝑡0 
Null point abscissa 
Length of the low gain part projected 
on the abscissa axis 
Difference between the highest and 
the lowest value of control current 
Slope of the low gain regression 
Standard deviation of null velocity 
points 
6.3.  Simulations 
 System’s modeling 6.3.1.
The physics-based modeling of the VSV loop is performed on the commercial software 
AMESim© [16]. AMESim is a proven tool for modeling and analysis of multi-domain systems. 
Models are described by nonlinear analytical equations that represent the system’s hydraulic, 
pneumatic, thermal, electric or mechanical behavior. To create a model, we use a set of libraries 
containing different components and subsystems which have been validated by different 
engineering domains. The main advantage of this type of simulation is that it allows capturing the 
system behavior before detailed CAD geometry is available. Hence, it is particularly useful in the 
upstream development stages of a system. 
Fig. 9: Raw data and smoothed velocity gain curve extracted from a simulation set 
 Uncertainties Propagation 6.3.2.
The propagation of uncertainties is performed via Monte-Carlo simulations. The Monte-Carlo 
samples are generated in Matlab-Simulink and a cosimulation interface sends the values of 
parameters to AMESim before finally retrieving the HI values in return. The main advantage of 
using this cosimulation scheme is that HI are available in the Matlab environment so both 
classical toolbox functions and specific processing script can be used directly. 
6.4. Health Indicators’ Validation 
 Specifications 6.4.1.
For this application, the specifications given by customers were the following ones: 
 𝑇𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶 = 0.9 and 𝐹𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶 = 0.01
 𝐷𝐻% = 90% ; 𝐼𝐻% = 80% ; 𝑃𝐻% = 90% 
 𝐿𝑈% = 100% 
 First Performance Metrics Computation 6.4.2.
This first computation of the detectability matrix (see the ten first columns of the detectability 
matrix in Fig. 10) shows that the four last lines have no column were the value of the detectability 
index is equal to 1. It means that those four degradation modes are not detectable. Because they 
are hazardous degradation modes, it means that specifications will not be meet so some 
complementary HI are needed.  
 Addition of new Health Indicators 6.4.3.
As explained before, the VSV loop contains two LVDT sensors measuring the position of 
cylinder. Ideally, both measures should be identical if the cylinders were strictly the same of if the 
value of 𝐾 (stiffness of the bound between cylinders) was high. Yet in reality, the cylinders are 
Fig. 10: NKPI for the set of health indicators: detectability matrix (left), 
localizability matrix (top right) and prognosticability matrix (bottom right) 
different from each other and the complexity of the kinematic results in a low 𝐾. Moreover, the 
failure modes analysis revealed that some hazardous degradation modes can induce a drift of 
LVDT values. From this observation, we have defined 8 HI listed in Table 4:  
Table 4: List of additional Health Indicators from the position profile 
HI Definition HI Definition 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑋1 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑋1 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑋 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑋 
LVDT1 max value 
LVDT1 min value 
Maximum gap between LVDT1’s 
and LVDT2’s position values  
Minimun gap between LVDT1’s and 
LVDT2’s position values 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑋2 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑋2 
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑋 
𝑠𝑡𝑑𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑋 
LVDT2 max value 
LVDT2 min value 
Mean gap between LVDT1’s and 
LVDT2’s position values  
Standard deviation of the gap 
between LVDT1’s and LVDT2’s  
 Second Performance Metrics Computation 6.4.4.
The second computation of the detectability matrix (see Fig. 10) shows that all the hazardous 
degradation modes are detectable. The identificability matrix is not shown but it would reveal that 
all the hazardous degradation modes are detectable. Eventually, the localizability matrix traduces 
that the five LRU are localizable and the prognosticability matrix shows that all the hazardous 
degradation modes are prognosticable.  
In the end, the computation of NKPI highlights that all the specifications for health indicators are 
validated: for 𝑇𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶 = 0.9 and 𝐹𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶 = 0.01, 𝐷𝐻% = 100%, 𝐼𝐻% = 100%, 𝐿𝑈% = 100%
and 𝑃𝐻% = 100%. It means that the selected set of HI is validated with respect to specifications. 
7. Conclusion
In this paper, the issue of dependability management in aircraft engines manufacturing industry is 
addressed through the following central problem: what are the solutions to improve availability to 
reduce maintenance costs. Over the last decade, one solution seems to impose itself: Prognostics 
and Health Management which is becoming increasingly important within the aeronautical field. 
However, despite its potential, PHM is still considered as a marginal process in the industry with 
neither formalized development process nor real validation tools.  
In the course of this paper, the authors have proposed a method to improve the selection and 
validation of health indicators for PHM in the early stages of the host system’s development 
process. The first section have introduced the PHM framework through a set of definition of 
threats, collecting vectors and processing means. The specificities of the PHM architecture in 
aircraft engines were also presented with focus on the collecting station. The selection of HI is 
based on the knowledge about the host system’s architecture, risk analysis methods, equipment 
specifications and acceptance test procedures. The validation is based on performance metrics 
called numerical key performance indicators defined from ROC curves. The computation of 
NKPI needs some distributions of HI obtained via a combination of physics-based modeling and 
uncertainties propagation.  
In the last section, the method is applied to the monitoring of the VSV loop in aircraft engines. 
After having determined the list of degradation modes and fault, the first selection of health 
indicators was based on the construction of the velocity gain curve, inspired from acceptance test 
procedures. The set of HI has unfortunately proved itself insufficient to detect all the hazardous 
degradation modes so some other HI were added to the set in order to improve the performance. 
This second set was validated because NKPI indicated that it allowed detectability, 
identificability and prognosticability of all the degradation modes and localizability of all the 
LRU.  
Thus, although not based on complex theory, the method showed very promising results which 
were welcomed by the industry because of their physical based aspect. The computation of NKPI 
allowed to support the presentation of the monitoring logic with some quantifiable aspects so that 
the host system designers have accepted to implement the collecting of these HI into future 
engines. This approach could become systematic in upcoming years because of the following 
observation: for aircraft engines manufacturer, the more than likely generalization of flight hour 
contract will make them responsible for unavailability costs whereas they currently make profit 
thanks to maintenance. Thus, this switch of business model will turn PHM into a strategic and 
unavoidable selling asset. 
In the end, the main future prospects are: first, to develop a method to recalibrate the model with 
the first operational measured data in order to validate the modeling part. Then, to use surrogate 
modeling to reduce the simulation costs of the uncertainties propagation and finally, the ultimate 
objective is to apply the method to the entire aircraft engine. 
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